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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200310001-8

26 February 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Laos. (*Page i*)
2. Peiping trying to rouse fears that US policy in South Vietnam may broaden conflict. (*Page i*)  
[Redacted]
4. British Guiana: Situation under control, but departure of British troops might mean further violence. (*Page ii*)  
[Redacted]
5. Congo: Tshombé seeks further assurances of UN protection in Leopoldville. (*Page iii*)  
[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

8. Czech party leader hints future purges. (*Page v*)  
[Redacted]

25X1

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

26 February 1962

## DAILY BRIEF

25X1

Laos: [ ] Terming Souvanna's latest cabinet slate "unacceptable," General Phoumi on 24 February again proposed a government composed of six functional councils under the leadership of King Savang. [ ]

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25X1

[ ] While Souphanouvong might be persuaded to accept Souvanna's slate with some modifications, it is highly unlikely that he would agree to support a government headed by King Savang, who in the past has been strongly opposed to both Souvanna and Souphanouvong. [ ]

25X1

25X1

Communist China - South Vietnam: Peiping's Foreign Ministry statement of 24 February on Vietnam, following close on two official declarations by Hanoi on the subject during the past week, is designed to generate international fears that US policy in South Vietnam may broaden the area of conflict. The establishment of a US military command in Saigon, the Chinese warn, marks a new stage that is in effect an undeclared war. Peiping rejects any description of US actions in South Vietnam as being only of a "local nature" and warns that the situation not only is a threat to North Vietnam but also "seriously affects" the security of Communist China. The Chinese demand for consultations among "the countries concerned" may presage a specific call for an international conference on South Vietnam.

Characterizing US actions as part of the "intensified attempt to suppress national liberation movements throughout the

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
world," the statement carries an implicit reminder to Moscow of the Communist responsibility to support revolutionary struggles. The statement suggests that unless US plans in South Vietnam are blocked, the danger of "wars on a bigger scale will be greatly increased." [redacted]

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\*British Guiana: (The colony is now in effect being run by a war council consisting of Minister of Home Affairs Rai, the brigadier commanding the British troops, and a number of the high officials responsible for security. The war council believes the situation is under control but that further interracial[redacted])


26 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1 [redacted]

# Republic of the Congo



25X1



26 Feb 62      CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN      Map Page

25X1

violence would break out if the British troops--at present numbering some 2,000--were to leave. Police morale is low, reflecting poor leadership and the repercussions of the 16-17 February disturbances. Rai, the minister responsible for police, has been taking action independently of Premier Jagan.

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25X1

Congo: Tshombe, following his 23 February announcement that he is prepared to go to Leopoldville this week for talks with Adoula, has asked UN authorities for assurances that a reported order for his arrest will be rescinded and that the UN will protect him from any action the Leopoldville parliament may attempt against him. Tshombe is likely to raise a series of further requests, similar to those made before his departure for Kitona last December. Reports from both Leopoldville and Elisabethville, moreover, indicate that the UN statement of 23 February which charges Tshombe with displaying bad faith since the Kitona agreement has clouded prospects for a successful meeting between him and Adoula.

25X1

Leopoldville's apparent intention to retake Kongolo and other areas of northern Katanga recently occupied by Tshombe's forces may further jeopardize chances for a reconciliation. Many of the troops Mobutu is airlifting to Albertville for this]

25X1

26 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

25X1

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25X1

[purpose are undisciplined and ineffective, and the movement was inadequately planned. The UN has withdrawn an earlier promise to provide air cover but may assist in moving vehicles. Tshombé's forces--reportedly officered by mercenaries--probably cannot be dislodged without extensive intervention by IIN troops.]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

26 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006200310001-8

25X1

25X1

Czechoslovakia: On 22 February, Czechoslovak party leader Novotny broadened the case against recently purged Rudolf Barak and strongly implied that Barak and his "collaborators" had attempted to seize control of the party. Novotny characterized the former politburo member and interior minister as a "political adventurer" who had been motivated by "personal political goals." He charged Barak with having organized "antiparty action" and with having sought to create distrust toward the party and government. Novotny warned potential Barak supporters that they "will sooner or later... finish... where Barak has landed."

This threat of future purges, plus the two-week interval between the announcement of Barak's ouster and the leveling of new, broader charges against him, suggests that there is a split in the Czechoslovak party over the issue of Barak's disgrace and that Novotny will insist on pressing charges of high treason against Barak.

25X1

25X1

26 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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